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Abstract 
Financial incentives are increasingly adopted to improve allocative efficiency and quality 
in primary care. Although it has been recognised that incentive-based remuneration 
schemes can have an impact on GP behaviour, there is still weak empirical evidence on 
the extent to which such programs influence healthcare outcomes and on the degree of 
physicians’ responsiveness to their introduction. This problem reflects the lack of 
adequate empirical data but also the complexity of general practice systems where many 
confounding and institutional factors are likely to influence physician behaviour. Given 
this background, we investigate the impact on quality of care of the introduction of pay-
for-participation incentives in primary care contracts in the Italian region Emilia 
Romagna. We concentrate on patients affected by diabetes mellitus type 2, for which the 
assumption of responsibility and the adoption of clinical guidelines are specifically 
rewarded. We test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients under the responsibility 
of GPs receiving a higher share of their income through these programs are less likely to 
experience hospitalisation for hyperglycaemic emergencies. To this end, we examined the 
combined influence of physician, organisational and patient factors through the use of 
multilevel modelling. Data were obtained form a large dataset made available by the 
Regional Agency for Health Care Services of Emilia Romagna. This dataset covers 
patients and GPs of the whole region and provides detailed information on healthcare 
consumption of the population, on the different components of GP remunerations, on 
morbidity levels of large groups of patients. Estimations are obtained for the year 2003. 
Keywords   
Primary care, pay-for-participation incentives, diabetes mellitus, multilevel modelling. 
JEL classification: I11, I18, C31 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In times of tight budget constraints major emphasis is attributed to appropriateness of 
care and General Practitioners (GPs) are more and more involved in demand control 
strategies. In this context, it is important to improve our understanding of the 
determinants of GPs behaviour, in order to identify the factors that guide allocative 
decisions and to evaluate the impact of the policy measures adopted at this scope.  
Empirical data display large variations in expenditures and consumption patterns 
associated with single practices [Wennberg et al., 1982]. First, this may be due to 
different medical needs affecting different populations. A second explanation lies in 
physicians' prescribing habits, that may vary according to specialisation, local clinical 
practice style, access to scientific information, etc [Davis et al., 2000; Grytten and 
Sorensen, 2003]. Finally, prescribing behaviour can be affected by the economic 
incentives [Scott and Farrar, 2003, Iversen and Luras, 2006] and by the organisational 
and institutional features of the system under which physicians operate (associations, 
medical networks, primary care groups, presence of a specialist centre in the area) 
[Wester and Groenewegen, 1999]. Given this background, we develop an empirical 
analysis of GPs behaviour, drawing from a dataset that links several epidemiological and 
administrative databanks, and provides relatively rich information on healthcare 
consumption of the population, on the different components of GP remunerations and on 
the prevalence of morbidity for large groups of patients. Using information for the Italian 
region Emilia Romagna that covers year 2003, the paper analyses the impact of pay-for-
participation incentives on health outcomes for diabetes mellitus type 2. At this scope, we 
evaluate the association between the onset of avoidable complications and geographically 
differentiated programs that increase capitation transfers to GPs for the assumption of 
responsibility of diabetic patients. 
Diabetes mellitus is a chronic condition listed among those known as "ambulatory care-
sensitive conditions" (ACSCs) [Billings et al. 1996; Yuen, 2004] for which adequate 
availability, accessibility and quality of primary medical care should be able to prevent 
hospitalisation. Hence, the rate of hospital admissions for hyperglycaemic emergencies 
can be used as an indicator of good clinical practice, since good quality of primary care is 
typically associated with low hospitalisation rates. [Booth and Fang, 2003]. We use 
hospitalization rates for hyperglycaemic emergencies to evaluate the influence of 
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programs aimed at improving the quality of diabetes care and to examine the joint 
influence of patient, physician, organisational factors by means of a set of multilevel 
models, that include controls nested at different hierarchical levels. 
Our main contribution to the existing literature consists of the analysis of the almost 
unexplored issue of the effectiveness of pay for participation programs in improving 
quality in primary care. An increasing number of studies has investigated the influence of 
economic incentives on GPs activity, but the large majority focuses on the impact of pay-
for-performance mechanisms. Given the central role of primary care for the governance 
of demand, pay for participation schemes represent a viable alternative, advocated (and 
implemented) in the belief that, being less invasive of physicians’ professional autonomy, 
in some cases, they may display relative advantages in inducing GPs to endorse the 
objectives of the healthcare planner and in fostering cooperation between primary care 
physicians and the other actors of the system.  
Other valuable aspects relate to the scope of the analysis and to the detail of the available 
information. The study covers a rather large initial population (around 4 million citizens) 
out of which the subset of diabetic patients is identified thanks to comprehensive 
information on consumption of disease-specific care (pharmaceuticals, outpatient visits 
etc…). Furthermore, the availability of clinical information on hospital discharges allows 
to focus on the outcome care, which is the proper policy target for the programs 
considered here, instead of output indicators, more frequently available in the health 
economics literature. Finally, the possibility of linking a large administrative database to 
personal medical payment records allows to jointly control for individual characteristics 
at the patient and physician level and, therefore, to account for several dimensions of 
individual heterogeneity that substantially improves accuracy of measurement of the 
impact of financial incentives. 
 
2. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND HEALTH CARE 
The economic theory of incentives assumes that an agent gets utility from the wage he 
receives and disutility from the effort he exerts on behalf of the principal [Prendergast, 
1999]. Thus, as argued by the literature on efficiency wages, higher wages and/or 
intensive monitoring are likely to increase workers’ effort. The trade-off between 
supervision and wages has been widely discussed in labour economics, outlining that, as 
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long as there is a conflict of interests and asymmetric information between employers and 
employees, wage incentives and supervision must be complementary and not substitute 
[Garcia-Prado, 2005]. The theoretical developments of the literature along these lines 
have therefore stressed the importance of establishing close links between monetary 
compensations and effective monitoring of performances. 
Alongside, an increasing stream of theoretical literature has argued that workers might 
respond not only to external interventions such as supervision and wage-premia, but also 
to intrinsic motivation, such as the influence of norms or customs, professional ethics and 
peers review. Drawing upon the basic Akerlof’s "social custom theory" [1980], this idea 
extends the standard theory by introducing concepts such as identity with the 
organisational goals, mission and implicit contracts [Benabou and Tirole, 2003].  
Intrinsic motivations seem to influence effort especially in areas characterised by personal 
relationships between principals and agents that imply trust and loyalty, in professional 
groups or where a public service ethos, ethical and moral responsibilities exist [Dixit, 
2002]. In this line, Frey (1993) discusses the importance of considering workers internal 
motivation in the design of monitoring regimes and incentive systems, challenging the 
belief that external interventions always lead to higher effort. According to Frey' 
Motivation Crowding Theory, the introduction of monetary rewards, where previously 
were none, can undermine intrinsic motivations and lead to lower productivity and 
participation [Scott and Farrar; 2003]. In other words, workers could reduce effort if they 
perceive external interventions as evidence of employer distrust [Frey and Jegen, 2001]. 
Contrary to the basic principal-agent model, in these cases, performance-related payments 
can be inefficient or sometimes even counterproductive.  
Compensation schemes based on performance can also have unintended consequences in 
presence of "multitasking", in particular when effort levels for some tasks are more 
difficult to measure than for others [Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991]. Multitasking 
implies that employers should be cautious in rewarding the achievement of specific 
targets, as long as they capture quality only to a limited extent or metrics are imperfect 
[Eggleston, 2005]. 
The design of incentive schemes that are effective in improving quality of care is a central 
policy issue for the health care sector [see Culyer and Newhouse (2000) for a general 
discussion; Gravelle and Masiero (2000) for an application to primary care]. Given this 
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purpose, it must be taken into account that, in health care, where physicians have strong 
ethical interest in their patients' health, the whole process of healthcare delivery, 
including aspects such as quality, efficiency and equity, is deemed to depend largely on 
workers' motivations. While it has been recognised that remuneration can influence GP 
behaviour, there are also "counter-balancing arguments" in line with those previously 
discussed [Gosden et al., 2001]. In particular, ethical values may dilute the influence of 
economic incentives and in health care there might be relatively less need for strong 
external incentives [Mooney and Ryan, 1993]. Besides, in this context there are many 
examples of multitasking and physicians may game the system for their own gain. For 
these reasons, high powered incentives based on performance might not always represent 
the optimal solution in terms of overall welfare gains and could distort physicians' 
behaviour emphasising only the dimensions that are explicitly rewarded. This is 
particularly true for financial incentives aimed to influence providers' allocation of effort 
across the various tasks associated to medical care. 
Despite the difficulties in obtaining robust indications about how financial incentives 
should be specifically designed to influence behaviour and health outcomes [Scott and 
Hall, 1995], the need to improve cost effectiveness and quality of care has led many 
private and public payers to adopt schemes based on physicians' performance measured 
through clinical and service quality indicators. For example, in 2003, the UK introduced a 
pay-for-performance contract for family practitioners that increases existing income 
according to performance with respect to 146 quality indicators [Smith and York, 2004]. 
Overall, the empirical literature on payments for quality in health care provides so far 
little evidence to support its effectiveness [Kristiansen and Mooney, 1993; Chaix-
Couturier et al. 2000; Rosenthal and Frank, 2006]. For example, they have been found 
ineffective in improving the level of immunisation uptake [Lynch, 1994] and the delivery 
of preventive care [Town et al. 2005]. In the UK, changes in per-item fees for maternity 
care and cervical cytology over the period 1966–1989 appear to have had little effect on 
the numbers of treatments; and service provision turned out to be more related to patient 
demand and to the availability of GPs [Hughes and Yule, 1992]. However, target 
payments for cervical cytology introduced in 1990 appear to have had a major impact, 
although it remains unclear whether economic incentives were the major responsible of 
the observed changes, as opposed to changing professional attitudes and increased patient 
demand [Whynes and Baines, 1998]. Again in the UK, the existence of fees for obstetric 
 7 
care did not prevent a sizeable reduction in the proportion of GPs willing to provide a full 
obstetric service between the 1960s and the 1980s [Whynes and Baines, 1998]. 
Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that the quality of activities fostered by 
incentives may not be high [Iliffe and Munro, 1993]. 
Despite the growing enthusiasm for, and adoption of, pay for performance mechanisms, 
there is some scepticism about the effectiveness of this approach in stimulating quality 
improvement and there are risks of unintended consequences, such as redirecting 
physicians time and attention away from their main purpose of caring patients. In 
response to  these concerns, payers are exploring also alternative incentive schemes for 
improving quality such as pay-for-participation programs. These mechanisms introduce 
compensations related simply to physicians' participation in collaborative activities and 
not to individual performances. Such financial incentives usually take the form of bonuses 
paid over and above the physician's base income from fee-for-service payments, 
capitation, or salary.  
This incentive scheme is now in its early stages of development and in surgical care, 
where the first applications have been implemented, is based on two elements. First, the 
availability of high-quality clinical data, including patient characteristics, processes of 
care and relevant outcomes. In most programs, performance data are not publicly 
reported. Second, at regular intervals physicians receive timely feedback on their 
performance relatively to that of their peers and during periodic meetings new 
interventions to achieve improvements are collectively discussed and implemented to all 
participants. More in general, the main distinguishing feature of this scheme in is that, 
unlike pay-for-performance initiatives, pay-for-participation programs neither link 
provider performance to financial reimbursement nor entail public reporting of provider 
level data. The (still very limited) empirical literature on the topic, based on the 
experience on surgical care, outlines that there are cases in which this kind of incentives 
may prove more effective in improving the quality of care. In particular, one of the 
potential advantages is physicians’ acceptation of this approach, together with significant 
improvement in providers’ adherence to evidence-based best practices [Birkmeier and 
Birkmeier, 2006]. Until now the use of pay-for-participation in national health system has 
been limited and the empirical evidence that this method works is almost absent, at least 
to our knowledge. Moreover, pay-for-participation methods that seem to work in 
specialties such as surgery may not be appropriate in primary care. 
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Following these premises, there are several questions that deserves further investigation 
at the empirical level, since incentive schemes that do not condition payments to the 
achievement of pre-defined individual targets present shortcomings that should not be 
overlooked. First, under these schemes, the incentive to dump more demanding patients 
may simply be shifted, increasing within groups of homogeneous patients even if it falls 
between groups. Physicians may be induced to avoid, in each group, those patients for 
whom the additional effort required exceeds the ad hoc transfers, with no guarantee that 
care will improve with respect to systems based on flat capitation. Moreover, we should 
improve our knowledge on the actual responsiveness of general practice to this kind of 
programs, since the lack of binding connections between individual results and financial 
transfers may strongly attenuate the influence on physicians behaviour. 
 
3. DIABETES CARE  
Diabetes mellitus is a major cause of morbidity and mortality in OECD countries. In 
Italy, approximately 2 million people are diabetic, and the prevalence is estimated at 
around 3%, with 90% of cases affected by diabetes type 2 (non-insulin dependent) and 
10% by type 1 (insulin dependent). Approximately 12% of the population over 65 years 
of age is affected by diabetes type 2 that is primarily treated in outpatient settings. Several 
studies [Diabetes Prevention Program Research Group, 2002; Beaulieu et al., 2007] have 
shown that intensive diabetes management can reduce the risk of onset and progression of 
long-term complications and ensure substantial cost containment in the long run. For 
these reasons, care is increasingly provided by primary care providers, whose regular 
clinical review is expected to assure good quality of treatment. 
Replacing specialty with primary care, however, raises two delicate points. First, under a 
capitation system GPs have limited incentives to identify new cases of diabetes and to 
treat personally diabetic patients. Screening and identifying diabetic patients is time-
consuming and GPs may be discouraged, as long as they receive the same fixed payment 
regardless of whether the patient is affected by a condition that requires special attention 
or not. This provides an incentive to refer patients identified as diabetics to the specialty 
clinic. As a result, the GP is less likely to view diabetes care as his responsibility and may 
exert insufficient levels of effort in following patients. To address this problem, health 
plans or provider organisations may introduce extra financial compensation to ensure 
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adequate incentives for treating disease in a primary care setting. For example, physicians 
may be entitled to a monetary bonus if they meet certain targets for diabetes treatment, 
such as standards for cost-effective prescribing (pay-for-performance schemes). A 
different approach increases capitation according programs that can have different 
features. A possibility is that the GP receives a financial bonus for the assumption of 
responsibility of each patient. Alternatively, compensations can be provided for GPs 
participation in audit meetings or for their adherence to evidence-based best practices. 
This latter scheme introduces a looser incentive structure with respect to the previous one, 
as long as it does not require an increase in the effort directly devoted to caring activities. 
To distinguish between these two different mechanisms, in this paper we include under 
the label “pay-for-participation” all financial transfers aimed at compensating GPs for the 
assumption of responsibility of patients, whereas we define “pay-for-compliance” all 
transfers associated to the mere participation in meetings and/or to the adherence to 
guidelines.  
Second, diabetes mellitus is associated with a number of short-term consequences that 
can lead to hospital admission. Clinical studies show that many hospital admissions for 
acute complications of diabetes can be prevented if appropriate outpatient care is 
provided [Billing et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1997; Booth and Fang, 2003]. Diabetic 
patients with limited access to ambulatory care are likely to be hospitalised with higher 
rates of advanced disease and have less favourable health outcomes than those who have 
benefited from adequate primary care services. In particular, diabetic ketoacidosis and 
hyperosmolar nonketotic coma are acute and potentially life-threatening emergencies that 
require immediate hospitalization. Even if hyperglycaemic emergencies can be the first 
sign of diabetes, more frequently, they arise from poor adherence to diabetes medications. 
As people who have poorly controlled diabetes mellitus are at greater risk for developing 
these complications, hospitalisation for acute hyperglycemic episodes can be prevented, 
in most cases, through early recognition and by avoiding errors in patient management. 
Although the Italian National Health System provides coverage for most physician and 
hospital services, other barriers to accessing care, such as patients socio-economic status 
and area of residence, together with physicians adherence to clinical guidelines and 
existing economic and organisational arrangements may have an impact on the 
development of acute complications of diabetes mellitus. 
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Emilia Romagna is located in the north-east of the country and has a population of about 
4 millions inhabitants. In the region, Local Health Authorities (LHAs) - subdivided into 
health districts encompassing at least 60,000 inhabitants- have had varying levels of 
involvement in monitoring diabetic services and, before the release of regional guidelines, 
there was no formal shared responsibility between primary and secondary care and 
patients could freely choose where to demand assistance. In 2003, the Regional 
Government released the “Clinical Guidelines for Management of Diabetes Mellitus”. 
They reflected the growing shift in emphasis from hospital to community care for people 
with type 2 diabetes, recognising that these patients, on the whole, need not be 
hospitalised [Fitzsimons et al, 2002]. Consistently with this view, the regional guidelines 
introduce an integrated care model, where co-ordination between different levels of care 
is implemented to make diabetes services easily accessible. According to this model, 
primary care physicians play a pivotal role in making the initial diagnosis and in ensuring 
that patients receive effective care. The recommendation suggests that type 1 diabetic 
patients are treated by secondary care through a diabetes outpatient clinic (DOC), 
whereas housebound type 1 and type 2 diabetic patients have to be treated in primary 
care. Primary care physicians should refer their type 2 diabetic patients to the local DOC 
on average once a year, for a formal comprehensive assessment and recommendations, or 
in any moment when the specialist advice is required regarding the management of 
metabolic control, cardiovascular risk factors or diabetic complications. Yet, the routine 
follow up has to be undertaken within primary care. 
 
4. MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
We use multilevel analysis to assess the joint influence on the outcome variable of a set 
of characteristics measured at different layers. Multilevel models are used to analyse data 
where observations are nested within groups [Scott and Shiell, 1997; Rice and Jones, 
1997; Duncan et al., 1998; Kothari and Birch, 2004]. In our case, patients characteristics 
are nested within general practices and in turn GP characteristics are nested within 
districts. Since data clustered within the same hierarchical level are likely to be 
correlated, the use of standard regression techniques would produce too small standard 
errors and overestimate the statistical significance of explanatory variables. A multilevel 
model gets rid of the problem because it analyses separately variation occurring at each 
level. 
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Given our dichotomous dependent variable, we estimate a logit specification of the 
general multilevel model [Snijders and Bosker, 2002], starting with an empty model 
(Model 1), to understand the basic partitioning of the variability between different levels. 
Then, we estimate a two-level variance components model including patient and 
physician characteristics, allowing the intercept to vary randomly at level 2 (Model 2), 
and, finally, a three-level logit model with random intercept including also district 
characteristics (Model 3).  
Our most general specification includes a hierarchical structure up to three levels of care: 
 
(1) 
 
where ijkpi corresponds to ( )1Pr =ijky  and ijky  is the realisation of a random variable 
ijkY  that is typically assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution. In our case, πijk represents 
the probability that a patient i falling under the responsibility of GP j in district k is 
hospitalised for an hyperglycaemic emergency.  
The fixed part of our estimates is represented by β0 + β1 Xijk. The random part is v0k + u0jk 
+εijk,, where εijk , u0jk   and v0k  are the random error terms at the level-1., level-2 and level-
3 respectively. The component u0jk measures the random variation of the intercept 
amongst GPs, while v0k measures the random variation of the same intercept amongst 
districts. Distributional assumptions for the random part of the model are as follows (see, 
for instance, Iversen and Luras 2000): 
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More important is the characterisation of the covariance between two patients l and h 
cared by the same physician in the same district: 
 (3) 
 
while the covariance between two patients l and h cared by physicians r and s, belonging 
to the same district k is: 
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with (Nj x Nt) denoting the size of the sub-matrixes included in (5). 
 
We use the estimated variance components obtained from the different specifications to 
calculate the intraclass correlation coefficients, interpreted as the fraction of total 
variability attributable to a particular level of care [Browne et al., 2005]. The intraclass 
correlation coefficient ICC is the proportion of variance (σ2) that is accounted for by the 
group level. It is equal to the correlation between values of two randomly drawn micro-
units in the same, randomly drawn, macro-unit: 
 variancetotal
units-macrobetween   variancepopulation
== ICCρ    (6) 
Larger values of ICC (0 < ICC <1) are indicative of greater potential for each particular 
level (GP, district) to influence the value of the dependent variable.  
Multilevel analysis are performed with Mlwin 2.2.0 [Rashbash et al., 2000]. We produce 
estimates using the Iterative Generalized Least Squares (IGLS) algorithm with 1st order 
marginal quasi likelihood procedure (MQL 1) but results are robust also using a 
predictive quasi-likelihood (PQL) procedure. The significance of coefficients is evaluated 
with the Wald statistic while goodness of fit is assessed using deviance [Goldstein, 2003].  
 
5. THE DATA 
The study population consists of all the regional type 2 diabetic patients in year 2003, for 
which fully linked data is available. We identify the cohort members by integrating data 
from multiple sources. 
Following WHO criteria, patients are classified as having type 1 diabetes if they were 
between 0 and 35 years of age at the time of diagnosis and are currently taking insulin; 
patients were classified as having type 2 diabetes if they were aged 35 or more at the time 
of diagnosis or if they are not currently treated with insulin. Specifically, we classify as 
diabetes patient anyone above 35 years who received at least one prescription for diabetes 
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medications (oral agents or insulin) during the year 2002. As some diabetes patients who 
are being managed through a diet and exercise alone can be missed with this strategy, we 
also include individuals who had at least one outpatient visit to a diabetic centre during 
the 2002 or an hospital admission with a diabetic diagnostic code in the previous two 
years. We have decided to exclude one district from the overall analysis, provided that its 
hospital admissions rates for hyperglycaemic emergencies - in a single hospital - were 
over 10 times the regional average. Therefore, to avoid inappropriately inflating the data 
because of a likely coding mistake, we have opted for a trimmed database, excluding 
2233 diabetic patients (1,34% of the total amount). The resulting dataset includes 164.574 
patients, 2.938 GPs and 38 districts belonging to 13 LHAs. 
As outcome measure we consider the diabetic hyperglycaemic emergency admissions 
associated with ketoacidosis and a hyperosmolar nonketotic coma for type 2 diabetic 
patients. Hospitalisations is identified from hospital records in which acute 
hyperglycaemia (ICD-9 codes 250.1 to 250.2) is documented as primary or most 
responsible diagnosis. The total number of adverse outcomes is 467, corresponding to the 
0,3% of the 164.574 total number of diabetes patients. 
Table 1 presents the explanatory variables. Patient demographics include age between 65 
an 75 years, age over 75 years and gender. Other patient characteristics are insulin 
dependence and number of visits to a diabetic outpatient clinic (DOC) during the year 
2003. Both variables are expected to capture severity of illness. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
The controls used at the GP level are gender, age and a dummy for type of practice, that 
distinguishes single-handed practice from the three level of partnership defined by the 
national contract for primary care: medicine in association; medicine in network; 
medicine in group. We also control for practice location with a dummy variable for 
deprived areas and two dummies related to the list size: one for a list size between 1100 
and 1500 patients per GP and one for list a size with more than 1500 patients. Following 
the literature [Levetan et al., 1999], we initially included also physician specialisation, but 
the small number of GPs completing an endocrinology fellowship did not permit to take 
into account the effect produced by a physician speciality which is specific for the disease 
we consider. Consequently, we included only a general dummy for the presence of any 
postgraduate qualifications.  
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As stated in Section 3, we distinguish among two kind of incentives mechanisms: 
financial incentives for each diabetic patients assumption of responsibility (Pay for 
participation) and financial incentives for participation in improvement activities and for 
compliance with regional and local guidelines of care (Pay for compliance), since both 
sets of special payments are likely to produce different impacts on health outcome. These 
variables are measured as the share of GPs annual income deriving from these two 
revenue sources. Table 2 shows the distribution of the two schemes across local areas 
with money amounts expressed in Euro, while Figure 1 presents the distribution among 
the 38 regional districts in percentage terms on GPs annual income. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
As regards the third level, we include a set of income dummies measured at the district 
level and obtained from census data. We consider three categories (low, medium-high, 
high) with the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles as cut-off points. As additional control to 
account for supply side characteristics, we include a dummy for the number of hospital 
beds in diabetes specialised wards. 
  
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table 3 presents different specifications of our ML model: the empty model (Model 1), 
the two levels logit model (Model 2) and the three levels logit model (Model 3). For each 
specification, we present the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) that illustrates the 
basic partitioning of the variability between different levels and the measures of goodness 
of fit. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
The empty model shows that the GP level accounts for the largest share of the variability. 
In particular, intra group correlation is equal to 9% at the GP and 3,3% at the district 
level. The result outlines the importance of differences in clinical practices among GPs 
and, to some extent, of different policies between districts. As expected, the introduction 
of explanatory variables for each hierarchical level reduces the residual variability within 
clusters. As for GPs, within group correlation of the unobserved component falls from 
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9% in the “empty” model, to 8.6% when patient related variables are included, and down 
to 2,4% when district area information is included.  
Quite interestingly, it is only with the introduction of a third layer in the model (health 
districts) that ρGP falls significantly and the second stage variance, σ2(u0jik), drops from 
0.309 to 0.084. The main indication seems to be that the area where the physician operate 
contributes to the variability between physicians more than the (observed) individual 
characteristics of the GP himself and of his group of patients. This is consistent with the 
result of a significant variability between districts reported in model 3 and we can 
conclude that the influence of the organisational arrangements defined at the local level is  
not negligible. 
The intercept β0 captures information related to the baseline case represented by a female 
patient , aged below 65, not insulin dependent, cared by a female physician that works in 
association in a urban area and whose list size is below the threshold of 1100. The 
baseline for the district characteristic is per capita income in the first quartile of the 
distribution.  
As regards the main hypothesis to be tested, our results report a significant association 
between the health outcome and (one set of) economic incentives received by GPs for 
diabetes care. Both coefficients related to ad hoc transfers display the expected negative 
sign, indicating that, other things equal, the larger the share of diabetes-related payments 
with respect to GP total revenues, the lower the probability of the adverse event for the 
diabetic patients included in the list. Furthermore, the coefficient associated with "Pay for 
participation" programs is significant and robust across specifications. On the contrary, 
the coefficient for "Pay for compliance" is never significant. 
Overall, our results support the idea that ad hoc financial transfers may contribute to 
improve the quality of care for targeted diseases, even when they are not based on the ex 
post verification of the achievement of specified targets, as for pay for performance 
programs. As long as, patients treated by physicians receiving a larger share of their 
income from specific diabetes programs do have a lower probability of experiencing an 
hyperglycaemic emergency, the strategy of complementing capitation with additional 
transfers according to the level of responsibility assumed by the physicians for this 
specific disease seems to have proved effective. At the same time, the potential 
improvements obtained through pay for participations schemes depend also on the 
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particular way the incentives are designed. When the only requirement is compliance to 
guidelines and general protocols, the advantages in terms of more favourable outcomes 
are negligible, and economic incentives are effective only when GPs involvement 
requires additional efforts more directly addressed to his/her patients. 
Among the other controls, patients' characteristics are the most important factors 
influencing the adverse outcome and all coefficients are fairly robust across 
specifications. Patients who are insulin dependent and who visits more frequently the 
local DOC have higher probability of emergency hospitalisation. Age has a non 
monotonous effect, with patients aged 75 or above displaying the highest probability of 
the adverse outcome. On the contrary, the group of patients between 65 and 75 years of 
age has a lower probability of emergency hospitalisation with respect both to younger and 
older patients. 
As for physician characteristics, GPs age and postgraduate qualifications do not have any 
significant effect, while gender has a (poorly) significant impact and only in Model 3. 
Most of the controls included at the practice level (medicine in network, medicine in 
group, rural practice location) do not influence the observed outcome either. An 
interesting exception is list size with the significant and negative coefficient for both 
dummies, suggesting a sort of volume-outcome association in the management of 
diabetes in primary care. This result confirms those obtained in previous studies for 
different institutional settings [Millet et al., 2007], according to which larger practices 
seem to be  able to provide better quality of diabetes care. Among the explanatory 
variables in the third level, only aggregate per capita income significantly contribute to 
capture part of the residual heterogeneity.  
As for the policy implications, a final note of caution must be raised, since pay for 
participation programs may not be fully exogenous. In principle, one might argue that in 
the areas where GPs had independently developed a more direct involvement in diabetes 
management, this may have also translated into a larger propensity among GPs to agree 
on incentive mechanisms focused on diabetes care. As a consenquence, high shares of 
income following diabetes programs might be associated to higher quality of care simply 
because GPs with better expertise might have encouraged the implementation of such 
programs from the LHAs and districts they belong to. 
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Even if not much is known of the details of the bargaining process between LHAs, 
districts and GPs, anedoctal evidence suggests that the largest share of the bargaining 
power relies on public payer side, that sets its priorities mostly according to the views of 
the local managing board. Therefore, individual propensity of GPs is unlikely to have 
exerted ex ante a crucial influence in the allocation of the public budget at the district 
level across different potential alternative programs. If this is the case, endogeneity is 
probably not such a serious problem in practice. 
Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not empirically testable given the cross sectional nature 
structure of our dataset, that does not allow to record how the probability incidence of the 
adverse outcome evolves over time with changes in the size of financial incentives. Fully 
linked data are not available at the individual level after 2003 and, as for the previous 
years, the incidence of hyperglycaemic emergency is so rare, to indicate that it was 
routinely not reported as primary diagnosis until 2003. 
Therefore, at this level of the analysis we can confidently outline a positive statistical 
association between ad hoc transfers to GPs and quality of care provided, while the full 
identification of a proper causal relationship, would require the availability longitudinal 
data. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we have assessed the impact of pay-for-participation incentives for GPs 
activity on health care outcomes. Our analysis is based on a regional dataset that provides 
information on patient conditions, GPs remuneration schemes and organisational 
arrangements. In particular, we have focused on the sub-population of patients affected 
by diabetes type-2 and we have considered as adverse outcome hyperglycemic emergency 
admissions associated with ketoacidosis. Patients conditions emerge as the major driver 
of the probability of an adverse outcome. At the opposite, controls for practice 
characteristics display much lower significance levels. The comparison of intraclass 
correlation across different specifications confirms the importance of data clustering at 
the geographical level. With the introduction of districts in the model, the fraction of 
variability attributable to GPs falls substantially, outlining a relative homogeneity among 
practices subject to the influence of the same management disease programs typically 
defined at the LHAs and district level.  
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The most relevant policy issue addressed in the paper concerns the impact of financial 
incentives aimed to improve quality of diabetes care through pay for participation 
schemes. Our results indicate that higher shares of GP income received through these 
programs significantly reduce the probability of hyperglycaemic emergencies for their 
patients. This is true when programs are aimed at stimulating GP assumption of 
responsibility in disease management, but not when only adherence to clinical guidelines 
is required. 
As for the possibility to derive more conclusive policy implications, substantial 
improvements could be obtained with the availability of longitudinal data that would 
provide a more clear-cut identification of causal relationships. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to extend the analysis to different sub-populations and types of disease by 
using a more comprehensive set of outcome indicators. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.  Explanatory variable definitions. Patient and GP characteristics, year 2003. 
Explanatory variable  Coding Mean/% Standard Deviation Min Max 
Patient level (n=164574) 
Patient gender  male=1 50,3    
Patient age continuous 67,9 12,83 35 107 
Patient age class 35 - 65  (ref) 37,9    
 65 - 75 30,0    
 > 75 32,1    
Insulin dependence (if yes=1) 15,6    
Visit to DOC continuous 0,92 1,70 0 9 
Physician level (n=2.938) 
GP gender Male=1 74,2    
GP age continuous 50,8 5,54 35 71 
GP age class 35 – 47 (ref) 21,0    
 47-53 52,3    
 > 53 26,7    
List size per GP < 1100 (ref) 35,4    
 1100-1500 55,0    
 ≥1500 9,6    
Practice type single-handed (ref) 31,4    
 association 13,6    
 network 33,5    
 group 21,6    
Practice location rural (if yes=1) 5,8    
Postgraduate qualification (if yes=1) 5,1    
Pay for compliance  Continuos (% annual income) 0,4 1,04 0 7,74 
Pay for participation Continuous (% annual income) 0,2 0,72 0,03 6,97 
District  level (n=38) 
Income  < 25% (0) 17,7    
 25-75% (1) 42,7    
 >75% (2) 39,5    
Hospital beds in endocrinology Continuos 15,7 9,9 2 28 
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Table 2.  Economic incentives distribution. Local Health Authorities, amounts in 
Euro, year 2003. 
  Pay for compliance  
(Adherence to local guidelines) 
Pay for participation  
(assumption of responsibility) 
LHA N°GP % GPs MIN MAX MEAN STD % GPs MIN MAX MEAN STD 
1 220 0,91 626,62 4679,18 2652,9 2865,59 1,36 154,95 1208,51 712,72 529,51 
2 297 0,67 671,37 1297,99 984,68 443,09 1,01 451,90 2386,09 1259,27 1005,90 
3 361 8,59 33,56 5081,89 1094,48 1156,76 6,37 201,42 2618,44 1526,51 628,83 
4 490 61,43 16,74 7452,54 1343,98 1246,11 2,86 185,92 5422,80 1476,07 1521,04 
5 379 35,62 15,49 7445,26 2660,64 1714,99 46,70 30,987 8025,97 1118,22 1171,66 
6 86 86,05 46,48 3501,87 1094,77 693,97 1,16 650,79 650,79 650,79 - 
7 139 61,15 285,03 7065,42 2569,41 1287,71 17,99 247,92 2696,13 1062,78 792,42 
8 85 32,94 123,96 4431,57 2348,56 1125,74 30,59 30,99 4822,41 827,61 970,84 
9 236 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,42 1316,96 1316,96 1316,96 - 
10 270 0,37 297,48 297,48 297,48 - 1,85 1226,58 4402,79 2805,01 1285,56 
11 113 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 35,40 344,30 5056,54 2128,40 1209,18 
12 130 5,38 198,32 2429,42 1165,13 761,12 63,08 65,22 5047,84 2410,61 993,76 
13 165 27,88 148,74 5032,36 1226,03 1015,37 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tot. 2971 23,96 15,49 7452,54 1734,49 1433,27 13,46 30,99 8025,97 1516,25 1228,91 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Economic incentives in % annual income. Districts, year 2003. 
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Table 3.  GP and patient factors predicting an hospital admission for hyperglycemic 
emergencies, year 2003. 
 Empty model - Model 1  Model 
2 
  Model 3  
Explanatory variables Coefficient SE p > Coefficient SE p > Coefficient SE p > 
FIXED EFFECTS          
Constant -5.884 (0.078) *** -6.492 (0.188) *** -6.831 (0.250) *** 
Patient level          
Patient gender     -0.159 (0.095) * -0.169 (0.094)   * 
Patient age 65-75    -0.324 (0.126) *** -0.328 (0.125)  *** 
Patient age >75     0.325 (0.107) ***   0.332 (0.106) *** 
Insulin dependence    1.913 (0.101) ***   1.877 (0.101) *** 
Visit to DOC    0.103 (0.021) ***   0.124 (0.021) *** 
Physician level          
GP gender     0.196 (0.124)    0.213 (0.122) * 
GP age 47-53    -0.138 (0.128  -0.153 (0.124)  
GP age >53    -0.061 (0.151)  -0.004 (0,139)  
List per GP 1100-1500    -0.262 (0.110) ** -0.258 (0.108) ** 
List per GP > 1500    -0.419 (0,178) ** -0.395 (0.176) ** 
Association    -0.141 (0.164)  -0.142 (0.169)  
Network    0.055 (0.121)  -0.014 (0.124)  
Group    0.157 (0.136)    0.196 (0.139)  
Practice location rural    -0.166 (0.213)  0.040 (0.236)  
Postgrad. qualification    -0.213 (0.240)  -0.266 (0.240)  
Pay for compliance     -0.062 (0.042)  -0.034 (0.051)  
Pay for participation    -0.222 (0.085) *** -0.210 (0.089) ** 
District area level          
Income 25%-75%       0.150 (0.201)  
Income ≥75%       0.771 (0.223) *** 
Beds in endocrinology       -0.233 (0.193)  
          
RANDOM EFFECTS          
Level 2 - σ 2 (u0jk) 0.339 0.175 * 0.309 0.165 * 0.084 (0.153)  
Level 3 - σ 2 (v0k) 0.122 0.051 **    0.079 (0.037) ** 
          
ρ GP 0.090   0.086   0.024   
ρ districts 0.033      0.023   
    
Deviance [-2ln(L)] -498614 -5843333 -590556 
          
**** p-value < 0.01 **  p-value < 0.05 * p-value < 0.10 
 
 
